volume	13,	no.	21 october	2013 Reason in its Practical Application E. Sonny Elizond0 University of Maryland, Baltimore County © 2013 E.	Sonny	Elizondo This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/013021/> "[T]here can, in the end, be only one and the same reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application." (Groundwork, 4:391)1 I t	is	a	commonplace	that	ethics	is	practical.	In	the	analytic	tradi-tion, this	practicality	has	often	been	taken	to	support	non-cogni-tivist,	or	expressivist,	accounts.	If	ethics	is	truly	practical,	the	thinking	goes,	then	ethical	judgment	cannot	be	in	the	business	of	cognizing an	ethical	subject	matter.	For	such	cognition,	supposing	it	were	even possible,	would	not	have	the	immediate	connection	to	motivation	and action	that	seems	essential	to	ethics.2 1. All	references	to	Kant	are	to	Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	1902–).	All translations	are	from	The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant,	general	eds.	Allen	W.	Wood	and	Paul	Guyer.	I	will	use	the	following	abbreviations in citations:	Critique of Pure Reason - KrV; Critique of Practical Reason - KpV; Critique of the Power of Judgment - KU; Critique of the Power of Judgment, First Introduction - KU EE; Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics - P; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals - G; The Metaphysics of Morals - MS; Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View - A; What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? - O; Lectures on Metaphysics - VM; Lectures on Logic - VL; Jäsche Logic - JL; Lectures on Ethics - VE; Lectures on Pedagogy - VP. 2. It	is	increasingly	difficult	to	offer	a	clear,	uncontroversial	characterization	of the	cognitivism/non-cognitivism	distinction.	The	traditional	criterion	of	truthaptness	no	longer	works,	since	many	expressivists	are	happy	to	embrace	truth, so	long	as	truth	is	understood	in	a	deflationary	way.	Indeed,	the	program	of quasi-realism,	developed	in	various	ways	by	the	two	leading	lights	of	expressivism,	Simon	Blackburn	and	Allan	Gibbard,	is	committed	to	extending	truth, knowledge,	and	the	whole	suite	of	traditionally	cognitive	concepts	to	ethical thought	and	language,	expressivistically	construed.	What,	then,	distinguishes the	cognitivist	and	the	non-cognitivist?	Following	remarks	by	Blackburn	and Gibbard,	I	will	understand	cognitivism	as	the	view	that	the	function	of	ethical judgment	is	to	describe,	where	the	paradigm	of	description	is	the	attribution of	properties	to	the	subject	of	judgment.	So	understood,	an	ethical	judgment is	a	claim	about	how	things	stand	with	respect	to	an	ethical	subject	matter	and, as	such,	is	assessable	in	terms	of	its	agreement	with	that	subject	matter	-	that is, it is	apt for substantial (and	not	merely	deflationary) truth.	For	example, according	to	the	cognitivist,	to	judge	that	murder	is	wrong	is	to	attribute	the property	of	wrongness	to	the	act-type	murder,	a	judgment	that	is	true	just	in case	that	act-type	really	has	that	property.	It	is	this	account	of	ethical	judgment that	the	expressivist	denies.	On	his	view,	ethical	judgments	may,	in	important ways,	mimic descriptive judgments, but they are not genuinely descriptive. They	do	not	attribute	properties;	they	do	make	claims	about	how	things	stand; and	so	they	are	not	apt	for	substantial	truth.	For	Gibbard's	view,	see	his	Wise ImprintPhilosophers' e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) As I say above, I think this convergence between expressivists and	Kantians	should	be	surprising.	For	again,	one	of	the	apparent	attractions	of	practical	rationalism	is	precisely	its	promise	to	reconcile practicality	and	cognitivism	by seating	ethical judgment in	a capacity	that	is	at	once	practical	and	rational.	Why,	then,	should	a	Kantian, like	Korsgaard,	be	driven	to	find	common	cause	with	the	expressivist? The answer, I think, is clear. Korsgaard denies cognitivism because	she	thinks	that	assigning	ethical	judgment	a	cognitive	function is tantamount to	attributing	such judgment to theoretical rather than practical reason. This is apparent from her many denunciations of (substantive)	moral realism,	which she regularly accuses	of construing	ethics	as	a	"theoretical"	or "epistemological"	discipline.6	Echoing Aristotle,	she	argues	that	the	point	of	ethics	is	not	knowledge	but	action.	It	is	not	about	correctly	tracing	the	contours	of	normative	reality but	about intelligently solving	practical	problems.	This is	not to	say, Korsgaard	claims, that	ethical judgments	cannot	be	correct	or incorrect. It is simply to say that such correctness cannot	be	understood and	Constructivism",	325,	and	the	Introduction	to	The Constitution of Agency, 22	note	20.	(In	the	latter,	she	cites	Gibbard	explicitly	and	approvingly.)	To	be fair,	Korsgaard	would	reject	my	claim	that	she	is	denying	cognitivism,	since she	believes that it is a	mistake to think that "the	business	of cognition is describing the	world" ("Realism	and	Constructivism", 325	note	49). Indeed, she	seems	to	think	of	her	project	as	helping	us	transcend	the	distinction	between	cognitivism	and	non-cognitivism,	which	she	understands	in	terms	of	a distinction	between	descriptive	and	prescriptive	uses	of	language	(ibid.,	310). Even	if	she	is	right,	though,	that	these	alternatives	are	not	exhaustive	-	that there	is	a	"constructivist"	option	not	countenanced	here	-	I	take	her	denial	of descriptivism	as	sufficient	reason	to	attribute	to	her	a	denial	of	cognitivism. For	an	interesting	attempt	to	distinguish	Korsgaard's	constructivism	and	expressivism,	see	Sharon	Street,	"What	is	Constructivism	in	Ethics	and	Metaethics?",	Philosophy Compass,	Vol.	5,	No.	5	(May	2010):	363–384. 6. E. g.,	"According	to	substantive	realism,	then,	ethics	is	really	a	theoretical	or epistemological	subject"	(Sources, 44);	"The	moral	realist thinks	of	practical philosophy	as	an	essentially	theoretical	subject"	("Realism	and	Constructivism", 324). Similar statements appear again and again in both	works. This association	of	cognitivism	with	theoretical	reason	also	explains	Korsgaard's claim	that	practical	reason	theories,	such	as	Aristotle's,	Kant's,	and	her	own, do not fit into the traditional cognitivist/non-cognitivist distinction, since they	do	not	assign	ethical	judgment	either	a	descriptive	or	prescriptive	function	(ibid.,	309).	See	also	note	5. Not	everyone,	of	course,	has	been	convinced	that	practicality	and cognitivism	are	at	odds.	One	prominent	family	of	views	tries	to	combine	these	elements	by	tying	ethics	to	specifically	practical	reason.	If ethical	judgment,	understood	as	an	exercise	of	practical	reason,	is	simply	about	what	one	should	do,	then,	it	seems,	we	can	account	for	the practicality	of	ethics	in	a	relatively	straightforward	and	attractive	way. So	long	as	practical	reason	can	give	rise	to	motivation	and	action,	ethical	judgment	can	too.3 Such practical rationalism	has	many variants, but it is	most commonly associated	with	Kant and	his followers. It should	perhaps	be more	than	a	little	surprising,	then,	to	find	increasing	convergence	between	expressivists	and	Kantians.	For	example,	two	of	the	most	prominent representatives	of these	positions,	Allan	Gibbard	and	Christine Korsgaard,	seem	to	think	of	themselves	as	in	deep	agreement	about	the nature	of	ethics.4	Gibbard	puts	his	point	in	terms	of	the	essentially	practical	states	of	mind	-	norm-acceptance,	plans,	and	the	like	-	that	ethical	judgments	express,	while	Korsgaard	refers	to	attitudes	of	endorsement	and	the	non-descriptive	function	of	normative	concepts,	but	the basic	claim	seems	strikingly	similar. Indeed,	Gibbard	is	clear	that,	by his	lights,	Korsgaard	just	is	an	expressivist,	and	Korsgaard	has	recently written	that	expressivism	is	true,	in	its	way.	Ethics	is	practical,	Gibbard and	Korsgaard	seem	to	agree,	all	the	way	down,	which	implies	that	the business	of	ethical	judgment	cannot	be	to	cognize	at	all.5 Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University Press, 1990) and Thinking How to Live (Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2003).	For Blackburn's	view,	see	his	Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford:	Oxford	University Press,	1993)	and	Ruling Passions	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1998). 3. Not	that	this	is	uncontroversial,	of	course. 4. Gibbard, "Morality	as	Consistency in	Living:	Korsgaard's	Kantian	Lectures", Ethics,	Vol.	110,	No.	1	(October	1999):	140–164;	Gibbard,	Thinking How to Live; Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,	1996);	Korsgaard, "Realism	and	Constructivism	in	Twentieth-Century Moral	Philosophy",	in	her	The Constitution of Agency	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008). 5. For	Gibbard	on	Korsgaard,	see	his	"Morality	as	Consistency	in	Living",	141,	and Thinking How to Live,	6	note	2. For	Korsgaard	on	expressivism,	see "Realism e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) it	seems	to	me	that	we lack	a	clear	understanding	of the	essential commitments	of such	a	position,	an	understanding that takes	seriously	the	distinction	between	theoretical	and	practical	reason	and serves to explain how and	why the latter has the same cognitive credentials	as	the	former.	My	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	try	to	go	some way	toward	providing	such	an	understanding,	through	an	examination	of the	very	figure	who inspires	Korsgaard's rejection	of	cognitivism:	Kant. For as I read him,	Kant construes the distinction between	theoretical	and	practical	reason	not	in	terms	of	a	distinction between	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	functions	but	in	terms	of	two distinct	applications	of	a	single	faculty	of	reason,	which	is	throughand-through	cognitive.	That	is	to	say,	both	theoretical	and	practical reason	function	to	cognize	a	subject	matter,	and	so	both	are	straightforwardly	subject to familiar	epistemic	standards	of truth,	warrant, and	knowledge. As	with	many	aspects	of	Kant's	philosophy,	these	matters	are	difficult	and	their	interpretation	controversial.	My	ambition	is	less	to	provide	a	complete	defense	of	my	reading	than	to	lay	out,	as	clearly	as	I can,	an	account	of	practical reason that is	at	once	plausibly	Kantian and	philosophically interesting.	Of course, even if I am right about Kant, this does not show that Korsgaard is ultimately	wrong about reason;	and	I	will	offer	no	direct	argument	against	her	position	here. Nonetheless,	I	believe	that	reflection	on	Kant's	true	view,	with	its	careful	treatment	of	and	respect	for	both	the	practicality	and	the	rationality	of	reason,	should	perhaps	lead	us	to	rethink	what	it	means	to	be	a rationalist	in	ethics. agree	with	Korsgaard	that	Aristotle	and	Kant	are	practical	rationalists,	but	I do	not	agree	that	they	deny	cognitivism.	To	this	extent,	my	reading	of	Kant places him closer to some contemporary Aristotelian views than Kantian views.	For	another	reading	of	Kant	that	emphasizes	his	continuity	with	the "practical	cognitivist"	tradition	that	includes	Aristotle,	see	Stephen	Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative	(Cambridge, MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2009).	I	came	upon	this	important	book	late in	working	through	this	material	on	my	own,	and	I	have	not	been	able	to	take full	account	of	it.	I	hope	to	do	so	in	the	future. in	a	straightforwardly	cognitive	way.	Since	ethical	judgments	are	not claims	about	how	things	stand	with	respect	to	an	ethical	subject	matter,	they	cannot	be	assessed	in	terms	of	their	agreement	with	that	subject	matter;	and	so	familiar	epistemic	standards	of	(substantial)	truth, warrant,	and	knowledge,	at	home in the	domain	of theory,	have	no straightforward	application	in	the	domain	of	practice.7	Thus,	practicality	and	cognitivism	really	are	at	odds, just	as the	expressivist thinks, and	tying	ethics	to	reason	does	nothing	to	change	this. If this	were	correct, it	would	be	a	very significant conclusion indeed,	shedding	light	not	only	on	ethics	but	on	the	nature	of	practical reason	generally.	But	I	do	not	think	it	is	correct.	Or,	at	least,	I	am	not convinced.	Whatever	the	merits	of	a	non-cognitivist	approach	to	ethics,	it	seems	to	me	too	quick	to	think	that	practical	rationalism	must imply	the	denial	of	cognitivism;	that	the	specific	nature	of	practical reason	-	that	in	virtue	of	which	it	counts	as	practical	rather	than	theoretical	-	requires	that	the	judgments	that	issue	from	it	lack	a	cognitive function. That is, despite	Korsgaard's arguments, I believe there remains	room	for	a	conception	of	practical	reason	that	is	at	once	practical	and	cognitivist. To	be	sure,	I	am	not	alone	in	this	belief.	Korsgaard's	view	of	the matter	is	far	from	uncontroversial,	and	there	are	apparent	versions of	practical	rationalism	that	are	avowedly	cognitivist.8	Still,	though, 7. Hereafter,	all	references	to	epistemic	standards	of	truth,	warrant,	and	knowledge	will	be	to	substantial	versions	of	these	standards	and	not	to	deflationary	analogs. 8. I	include	here	Thomas	Nagel	and	T.M.	Scanlon,	both	of	whom	Korsgaard	regards	as	paradigms	of	theoretical	rationalism,	a	characterization	they	would certainly	deny	(Sources, 40–42; "Realism	and	Constructivism",	324).	For	Nagel's	view, see	his	The View from Nowhere (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press, 1986).	For	Scanlon's	view,	see	his	What We Owe to Each Other	(Cambridge,	MA: Harvard	University	Press,	1998).	More	interestingly,	perhaps,	I	also	include here	neo-Aristotelian	philosophers,	such	as	Warren	Quinn	and	Philippa	Foot, who	quite	clearly	think	of	practical	reason	as	a	cognitive	faculty.	For	Quinn's view,	see	his	"Putting	Rationality	in	its	Place",	in	his	Morality and Action	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1993).	For	Foot's	view,	see	her	Natural Goodness	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001).	I	say	this	is	"more	interesting"	because,	as	I	note	above,	Korsgaard	thinks	that	Aristotle	and	Kant	are both	practical rationalists, and so, it	would seem,	both	deny	cognitivism. I e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) cognition	is	to	cognize	-	i. e.,	to	produce	cognition.	The	function	of	the faculty	of	desire	is	to	desire	-	i. e.,	to	produce	desire.	Etc.10 We	can	begin to	fill	out these functions	by	examining	Kant's taxonomy	of	representation	in	more	detail.	Of	particular	importance	for present	purposes	is	the	genus	of	which	both	cognition	and	desire	are species:	objective	representation	(KU EE 20:206–208, MS	6:211–212). Objectivity	here	is	understood	in	terms	of	the	functional	relation	between	a representation	and its	object. It is the function	of	objective representations	to	fit	their	objects.	This	is	easiest	to	see	in	the	case	of cognition,	but	desire	too	is	objective	in	this	same	sense.	The	key	point here	is	that	there	are	two	distinct	ways	in	which	a	representation	can come	to	fit	its	object.	In	the	first	way,	the	representation	functions	to achieve	fit	by	conforming	to	the	given	object.	In	the	second	way,	the representation	functions	to	achieve	fit	by	conforming	the	object	to	the given representation.	The former representational function is	definitive	of	cognition.	The	latter	representational	function	is	definitive	of desire.11	For	example,	if	I	perceive	a	flower	through	my	window,	this representation	functions	to	represent	the	flower	as	it	is,	out	there	in my garden. But if I desire the flower, as a gift for	my	beloved, this representation	functions	to	bring	about	the	flower,	in	the	hands	of	my beloved.	To	mark	this	difference	in	ways	of	achieving	representational fit,	we	can	say	that	cognition	specifically	functions	to	be	accurate	and desire	specifically	functions	to	be	efficacious. Moving, then, from	representations to the faculties that function to produce them,	we can say	more precisely	what the functions of the faculties of cognition and desire are. If the faculty of cognition functions to produce cognition, and cognitions are representations that function to	be	accurate, then the faculty	of cognition functions 10. I	set	aside	the	faculty	of	pleasure	for	now,	since	it	plays	only	a	supporting role	in	the	current	drama.	I	will,	however,	have	something	more	to	say	about it	in	§III. 11. Borrowing	a	contemporary	metaphor,	we	might	say	that	there	are	two	mindworld	relations:	one	in	which	the	mind	is	fit	to	the	world,	and	one	in	which the	world is	fit to the	mind.	Objective representations function to	achieve mind-world	fit,	but	they	can	do	so	in	different	ways. I Though	my	interest	is	in	the	Kantian	account	of	practical	reason,	I	will begin	by	discussing	the	Kantian	account	of	the	will.	In	the	context	of Kant's	theory,	this	shift	in	focus	should	seem	rather	natural.	After	all, Kant	is	clear	that	the	will	is	nothing	other	than	practical	reason;	and	so we	should	expect	that,	in	understanding	the	one,	we	are	at	the	same time	understanding	the	other	(G	4:412).	Moreover,	approaching	practical	reason	from	the	side	of	the	will	also	affords	the	opportunity	to	face directly	what	is	perhaps	the	most	significant	puzzle	about	a	cognitivist	conception	of	practical	reason	-	viz.,	how	anything	cognitive	could be	at	the	same	time	practical.	I	believe	that	we	can	gain	insight	into this	issue	by	reflecting	on	the	rudiments	of	Kant's	account	of	mind	in general.	Such	reflection	will	allow	us	to	see	what,	according	to	Kant, makes	a	faculty	or	state	cognitive	and	what	makes	a	faculty	or	state practical.	With	a	clearer	view	of	both	of	these	elements,	we	will	be	better	positioned	to	understand	Kant's	attempt	to	reconcile	them. According	to	Kant,	to	have	a	mind	of	any	kind	-	intellectual	or	sensible,	rational	or	animal	-	is	to	have	a	faculty	of	representation.	As	a first	approximation,	then,	we	can	understand	the	mind	as	a	capacity to possess or produce representations,	where 'representation' is understood	capaciously,	so	as	to	include	perceptions,	desires,	sensations, etc.	But	this	is	only	a	first	approximation,	since	Kant	is	clear	that	the faculty	of	representation	is	not,	so	to	speak,	a	brute	power,	producing representations	in	the	way	a	decaying	atom	produces	radiation.	This	is because	the	faculty	of	representation	is	functionally	organized. Kant	is clearest	about	this	in	his	decomposition	of	the	generic	faculty	of	representation	into	the	three	particular	faculties	of	cognition,	desire,	and pleasure	(KU	5:177–179,	KU EE 20:206).	These faculties	are individuated	by	their	essential	functions	-	in	particular,	by	the	kind	of	representation	it	is	their	business	to	produce.9	The	function	of	the	faculty	of 9. For expressions of Kant's teleological approach to the	mind, see	KrV A51/ B75,	KrV	A294/B350–A295/B351,	KrV	A642/B670,	G	4:432,	KpV	5:119–120,	KU 5:187,	KU	5:119–120,	JL	9:11–13,	etc. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) desire,	in	more	detail.	I	claimed	above	that	the	faculty	of	desire	functions to	produce	desires.	As this characterization suggests,	Kantian desires	are	more	like	outputs	than	like	inputs	of	the	motivational	system.12	Consequently,	on	Kant's	view,	desires themselves	have	a	history.	There	is	an	account	to	be	given	about	how	and	why	a	particular (kind	of) faculty	of	desire	produces the	particular (kind	of)	desires that it	does.	The	Kantian form	of such	an	account	appeals to	determining	grounds	of	the	faculty	of	desire	-	i. e., features	of	an	individual's	psychology	that	explain	why	she	desires	as	she	does.	Whatever their	more	particular features,	Kant thinks that	such	grounds	are	always	instances	of	two	generic	types:	those	that	are	sensible	and	those that	are	intellectual. When	the	determining	ground	of	the	faculty	of	desire is	sensible, Kant	thinks,	then	it	is	feeling	that	explains	why	the	subject	desires	as it	does.	The	paradigm	case	here	is	the	hungry	animal	who	discovers a tasty-looking	morsel of food.	When	a	mouse, say, spies the	bit of cheddar	that	falls	from	my	sandwich,	its	perception	arouses	a	sensory pleasure,	which	causes	its	subsequent	desire	to	eat	the	cheese.	To	be so	moved	by sensible	determining	grounds is to	possess a sensible faculty	of	desire. When the	determining	ground	of the faculty	of	desire is intellectual,	however,	it	is	not	feeling	but	an	intellectual	representation	that explains	why	the	subject	desires	as	it	does.	To	see	how	such	an	explanation	might	go,	we	must	look	a	bit	more	closely	at	Kant's	view	of	the intellect.13	Kant	regards	the	intellect	-	"understanding"	or	"reason"	in the	broadest sense	-	as a specifically conceptual capacity (KrV	A19/ 12. Notice,	then,	that	the	agent	does	not	act	on	desire,	as	we	are	apt	to	say.	Rather, the	agent	acts	through	desire,	since	to	be	in	a	state	of	desire	is	simply	to	be	in a	state	that	functions	to	bring	about	its	object. 13. One	might	ask,	where	does	the	intellect	fall	in	the	tripartite	division	of	mental	powers	I	introduced	above?	The	answer,	as	will	become	clear,	is	that	it belongs to the faculty of cognition. I do	not emphasize this here, though, since	even	a	non-cognitivist	Kantian	such	as	Korsgaard	allows	the	intellect to	determine	the	faculty	of	desire.	She	simply	thinks	that	when	the	intellect does	this,	it	does	not	do	so	in	its	cognitive	capacity.	Of	course,	I	disagree,	but I	will	only	begin	to	argue	the	point	in	the	next	section. to	produce	accurate	representations.	And	if	the	faculty	of	desire	functions	to	produce	desire,	and	desires	are	representations	that	function to	be	efficacious,	then	the	faculty	of	desire	functions	to	produce	efficacious	representations. Now, since the faculties of cognition and desire have functions, these	faculties	are	subject	to	standards.	That	is,	they	can	be	evaluated as	successful	or	unsuccessful	to	the	extent	that	they	fulfill	or	fail	to	fulfill	their	functions.	Since	these	standards	are	grounded	in	the	nature	of the	faculties,	they	apply	to	these	faculties	as	such.	They	are,	in	a	word, constitutive	standards.	As	constitutive	standards,	these	standards	are not	the	products	of	any	representational	activity	-	as	in	the	legislation of	positive	law	-	and	they	do	not	need	to	be	themselves	the	objects of	any	representation.	After	all,	animals	have	faculties	of	representation.	Representational	standards	apply	to	these	faculties,	even	though animals	lack	any	capacity	to	set	such	standards	or	even	to	represent them.	Put	another	way:	While	animal	faculties	are	subject	to	standards, the	exercise	of these faculties is	not	guided	by	standards.	This is	not, however,	to	say	that	normative	guidance	has	no	place	in	Kantian	psychology. Indeed, as	we shall see,	Kant thinks that such guidance is necessary	for	and	even	constitutive	of	the	exercise	of	specifically	intellectual	faculties,	including	the	will.	But	even	where	there	is	guidance, this	does	not	mean	that	the	relevant	standards	are	products	of	activity. Rather, they	are	presupposed	by	activity,	since they follow	from	the nature	of	the	relevant	faculty	itself. Applying this framework to the faculties of cognition and	desire, we	can	easily	see	what	constitutive	standards	govern	these	faculties. If the faculties	of cognition	and	desire function to	produce	accurate and	efficacious representations respectively, then these faculties	are successful	to	the	extent	that	they	in	fact	produce	such	representations. The	faculty	of	cognition	is	successful	when	its	representations	are	accurate.	The	faculty	of	desire	is	successful	when	its	representations	are efficacious. With	this	general	account	of	objective	representational	faculties	in the	background,	I	want	to	examine	the	practical	faculty,	the	faculty	of e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) a	feeling	of	horror	at	the	prospect	of	wet	socks	that	we	can	begin	to understand	the	connection	between	reason	and	desire.	According	to Kant,	though,	not	all judgments	are	in	this	way	ordinary,	and	so	the powers	of	our	intellect	are	not	so	limited. Kant distinguishes two different kinds of judgment: theoretical and	practical.	He	characterizes	this	distinction	in	a	number	of	different	ways,	but	perhaps	his	most	common	way	of	putting	the	point	is in	terms	of	judgments	of	what-is	and	judgments	of	what-ought-to-be (G	4:387,	KU	5:171,	KU EE	20:195, JL	9:86).	This is, in	some	ways,	an unfortunate	framing,	as	it	suggests	that	in	both	cases	the	subject	matter	is	some	state	of	the	world.	It	is	clear,	however,	that	Kant	does	not mean	this.	While	theoretical	judgment	is	about	the	world	in	the	most general sense, practical judgment is not about the world	-	at least not	directly. It is	about	what rational	agents should	do in the	world. Kant	clearly	signals this	agential focus in	other	characterizations	of practical judgment, in terms of judgments of freedom (as opposed to	nature)	and judgments concerning	acting (as	opposed to	being). Properly	understood, then,	practical judgment	concerns	not	merely what-ought-to-be	but	what-ought-to-be-done	by	rational	agents.	We may,	of	course,	render	judgment	about	the	former.	But,	Kant	thinks, such	judgments	must	ultimately	depend	on	our	judgments	about	the latter.	What	states	of	the	world	ought	to	be	are	just	those	states	of	the world	that	would	result	from	rational	agents	doing	what	they	ought to	do.	Kant	brings	all	these	strands	of	thought	together	in	the	second Critique,	when	he	claims	that	"the	only	objects	of	a	practical	reason [and	so	of	a	practical	judgment]	are	therefore	those	of	the	good	and the	evil",	which,	he	says,	are	referred	to	actions	or	willings	and	not	to effects	(KpV	5:58,	KpV	5:60,	G	4:413). It should	be fairly obvious, then, that only	practical judgment is suited	to	serve	as	a	distinctly	intellectual	determining	ground	of	the faculty	of	desire,	for	only	practical	judgment	has	as	its	object	this	determination	itself	(KpV	5:20,	KpV	5:65).	For	example,	I	may	desire	to tell	you	a	joke	simply	because	I	love	the	sound	of	your	laughter.	But	I may	also	desire	to	do	so	because	I	think	it	is	good	to	lighten	your	mood B33,	KrV	A51/B75).	As	such,	the	intellect	allows	us	not	merely	to	represent	objects	but	to	represent	those	objects	under	concepts	and	so to	think	about	them.	Thought	here	is	understood	propositionally, in terms	of (predicative) judgment. Indeed, since	Kant thinks that concepts	are	nothing	but	predicates	of	possible	judgments,	he	goes	so	far as	to	claim	that	all	activities	of	the	understanding	can	be	traced	back to	judgment,	"so	that	the	understanding	in	general	can	be	represented as	a	faculty	for	judging"	(KrV	A69/B94).14	It	seems,	then,	that	the	intellect	can	determine	the	faculty	of	desire	if	and	only	if it	can,	through judgment,	bring	a	subject	to	desire.	To	be	so	moved	by	intellectual	determining	grounds	is	to	possess	an	intellectual	faculty	of	desire,	a	will. The	role	of	judgment	here	bears	further	discussion.	For	the	mere involvement of judgment in the etiology of desire does not suffice for	volition.	After	all,	a	judgment,	as	much	as	any	sensory	representation,	can	give	rise	to	feelings.	And	if	the	explanation	of	why	the	agent comes	to	desire	is	simply	that	she	feels	a	certain	way,	then	it	does	not matter	whether	the	representation	that	aroused	the	feeling	originates in	the	intellect	or	sensibility;	the	determination	itself	remains	sensible (KpV 5:23).	Consider,	perhaps,	a	person	who	enjoys	doing	logic	puzzles.	Her	representations	can	be	through-and-through	intellectual,	but so	long	as	she	manipulates	these	representations	simply	for	the	fun	of it,	then	it	is	feeling	that	determines	the	faculty	of	desire.	What	is	necessary,	then,	for	the	intellect	to	determine	the	faculty	of	desire	-	and so	what	is	necessary	to	will	-	is	for	judgment	itself	rather	than	mere feeling	to	be	a	determining	ground. Moreover,	not	just	any	judgment	appears	fit	for	this	duty.	As	Hume noticed, it is difficult to see any direct practical import in ordinary judgments	about	ordinary	matters	of	fact.	For	example,	the	judgment that	umbrellas	keep	one	dry	in	the	rain,	considered	as	such,	does	not seem	to	have	motivational	significance.	It	is	only	when	we	posit,	say, 14. I	obviously	skate	over	many	complexities	here.	The	best	treatment	of	these issues	I	know	is	Béatrice	Longuenesse's	Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique	of	Pure	Reason (Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1997). e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) This	is	not	to	say	that	sensibility	plays	no	role	in	the	determination of the	will. It is simply to say that	when sensibility	does	play such a role, it can	do so	only through the connection	of feeling to judgment.	For	example,	I	think	this	is	exactly	what	is	going	on	with	the prudent shopkeeper from	Groundwork I.	This	person	-	call	him "Peter"	-	judges	that	it	is	good	to	charge	a	fixed	price	in	order	to	secure a	reputation	for	honest	dealing,	but	he	makes	this	judgment	only	because	he	regards	the	volition	as	in	his	interest,	which,	for	Kant,	is	just to say that he is pleased	by the	prospect of its efficacy.17 In such a case,	feeling	does	play	an	essential	role	in	determining	Peter's	faculty of	desire.	But	even	here, this feeling	does	not	determine	his faculty directly,	as	it	would	in	a	mere	animal.	It	stands	at	one	remove,	serving as	a	condition	of	the	judgment	that	is	itself	the	determining	ground. Peter	judges	the	volition	good	because	of	the	feeling.	But	it	is	always, properly	speaking,	his	judgment	and	not	his	feeling	that	explains	why he	does	what	he	does.18 Even	if	one	accords	practical	judgment	this	constitutive	role	in	willing,	however,	one	might	still	think	that	the	psychological	story	I'm	telling	is	incomplete.	After	all,	surely	it	is	possible	for	an	agent	to	think that	she	should	do	something	and	yet,	for	all	her	rational	conviction, feel	no	impulse	to	do	so.	And	if	this	is	possible,	then	don't	we	need an additional element to	mediate between judgment and	desire, to explain	how	reason	can	motivate?	Kant's	answer,	I	think,	is	no.	This	is not	to	deny	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	our	practical	judgments	can	fail	to move	us.	But,	on	Kant's	view,	this	possibility	does	not	show	that	practical	judgments	require	motivational	supplement.	It	shows	only	that	the functioning	of	our	motivational	systems	is	subject	to	interference	and 17. Notice	that,	on	Kant's	view,	what	Peter	wills	is	not	a	bare	action	-	charging his	customers	a	fixed	price	-	or	a	bare	purpose	-	securing	a	reputation	for honest	dealing	-	but	an	action	paired	with its	purpose	-	to	charge	his customers	a	fixed	price	in	order	to	secure	a	reputation	for	honest	dealing.	It	is this	entire	complex	that	Kant	means	to	capture	when	he	individuates	willings in	terms	of	maxims. 18. As	this	suggests,	understanding	why	an	agent	wills	requires	understanding why	she	judges.	I	elaborate	on	this	important	point	in	§II. in this	way. In the	first	case, feeling	alone	moves	me. In the	second case, intellect intercedes.	My	judgment	explains	my	motivation,	and so	what	would	otherwise	be	a	sensible	desire	becomes	an	intellectual one,	a	volition.	This	is	what	it	is	to	will:	to	come	to	volition	through	a judgment	that	that	volition	is	good.15 It	is	important	to	emphasize	how	tightly	judgment	and	will	are	conjoined	here.	For	there	are	ways	of	reading	Kant	that	allow	more	space between	these	elements	than	I	believe	Kant	in	fact	permits.	First	of	all, there	is	a	tendency	to	think	of	the	will	in	Kant	as	a	capacity	to	be	determined	either	by	reason	or	by	sensibility.	This	is	not	correct.	Strictly speaking, the	will is	always determined	by reason through	practical judgment.	If	a	subject	comes	to	desire,	but	not	because	she	judges	that it	is	good	to	do	so,	then	her	desire	is	simply	not	volition.	She	may	act, but	she	does	not	will.16 15. Compare	Kant's	discussion	of the "guise	of the	good" thesis in the second Critique.	He	claims	there	that	the	thesis	is	ambiguous,	since	it	leaves	undetermined	whether	we	represent	a	thing	as	good	because	we	desire	it	or	we desire	it	because	we	represent	it	as	good.	Clearly,	Kant	thinks	that	the	latter is	true,	at	least	as	far	as	the	will	is	concerned.	In	this	case,	"the	concept	of	the good	is	the	determining	ground	of	desire	(of	the	will);	...	[and]	we	will	something	in	consequence of this idea [of	the	good],	which	must	precede	volition	as its	determining	ground"	(KrV	5:59n,	Kant's	emphasis). 16. This	raises	the	question	of	how	widespread	willing	really	is.	This	is	a	difficult and	delicate	issue,	which	I	cannot	discuss	in	detail	here.	Suffice	it	to	say,	if we identify	willing	with	practical judgment, in the	way that I	have, it	may seem	that	we	do	not	will	nearly	as	often	as	we	think.	How	uncomfortable	this makes	us	depends	on	what	alternatives	to	willing	we	think	available.	If	we think	of	acting	that	is	not	willing	simply	as	animal	action,	of	the	sort	exemplified	by	the	hungry	mouse,	we	are	likely	to	feel	quite	uncomfortable	indeed. But if	we think	of	acting that is	not	willing	as including intentional	action, albeit action that is not guided	by	practical judgment, then	we	might feel less	distressed.	Consider,	perhaps,	the	actions	of	young	children,	who	do	not yet	have the	conceptual resources	necessary for	practical judgment	but	do not	thereby	lack	intentional	agency,	or	akratic	agents,	who	intentionally	do other	than	they	think	they	should.	To	allow	for	such	possibilities,	we	would have	to	distinguish	the	will from	the	capacity	to	form	and	act	on	intention. Many	philosophers,	even	Kantians,	do	not	make	such	a	distinction.	Perhaps they	should.	For	interesting	discussion	of	competing	accounts	of	the	will	that takes	up	similar	issues,	see	Gary	Watson,	"The	Work	of	the	Will",	in	his	Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004). e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) answer, it seems	clear,	depends	on the status	of	practical judgment. If	practical	judgment	is	cognitive,	then	practical	reason,	which	issues such	judgment,	must	be	cognitive	too. To	assess	the	cognitive	credentials	of	practical	judgment,	consider again	the	distinction	between	theoretical	and	practical	judgments	introduced	above.	The	distinction,	I	claimed,	turns	on	two	issues.	First, theoretical	and	practical judgment	differ in their	subject	matter: the former	has	a theoretical	object (what-is),	and the latter	has	a	practical	object	(what-ought-to-be-done).	Second,	theoretical	and	practical judgment	differ	in	their	connection	to	the	faculty	of	desire:	the	former determines	the	faculty	of	desire	only	mediately,	and	so	serves	to	motivate	only	through	another	representation;	and	the	latter	determines the	faculty	of	desire	immediately,	and	so	serves	to	motivate	through itself.	Thus,	practical	judgment	is	practical	in	two	respects.	It	is	practical	in	its	object,	and	it	is	practical	in	its	issue. The	question,	then,	is:	Do	these	dimensions	of	practicality	serve	to impugn	the	cognitive	credentials	of	practical judgment? I	do	not	believe	that	they	do.	The	difference	in	subject	matters	seems	on	its	face irrelevant	to	cognitive	status.	And	if	Kant	is	already	comfortable	claiming	that	judgment	can	motivate,	it	is	not	immediately	clear	on	what	basis	he	would	resist	thinking	that	cognition	could	do	so	too.	Moreover, Kant	regularly	refers	to	practical	cognition	[praktische Erkenntnis]	and often	explicitly	characterizes	the	theoretical/practical	distinction	as	a distinction	within	the	cognitive	domain	(JL	9:86,	KrV	Bx,	KpV	5:19–20). If	we	take	him	at	his	word,	then, it	seems	that	Kant	counts	practical judgments	as	no	less	cognitive	than	their	theoretical	counterparts. But	maybe	it	is	a	mistake	to	take	Kant	at	his	word	here.	Maybe	the "cognition"	in	"practical	cognition"	is	meant	loosely,	referring	to	something	more	like	rule-governed	thought.	After	all,	as	I	explained	in	§I,	a cognition,	as	Kant	understands	it,	is	a	representation	that	functions	to be	accurate;	and	one	might	well	wonder	whether	this	model	really	has application in the	practical	domain.	True,	practical judgments represent	volition	as	good,	but	can	such	judgments	be	legitimately	assessed in	terms	of	their	accuracy,	in	terms	of	whether	the	volition	represented so	capable	of	defect.	Thus,	though	there	may	be	various	impediments that preclude the transition from judgment to desire,	Kant believes that	there	is	no	further	psychological	act	or	element	necessary	to	effect this transition. It is the	natural	operation	of the	will, the faculty through	which	practical	judgment	is	immediately	practical.19 Put	another	way:	The	practicality	of	reason	is	a	premise	of	the	Kantian	argument.	It	is	not	a	conclusion.	Kant	never	questions,	even	hypothetically,	whether	reason	is	practical,	whether	reason	can	determine the	will.	"Reason",	as	he	says,	"always	has	objective	reality	insofar	as volition	alone	is	at	issue"	(KpV	5:15).	All	he	questions	is	whether	pure reason	is	practical,	whether	"pure	reason	of	itself	alone	suffices	to	determine	the	will	or	whether	it	can	be	a	determining	ground	of	the	will only	as	empirically	conditioned"	(KpV	5:15).	To	this	extent,	then,	Kant is	not	answering	Hume's	skepticism	about	practical	reason.	Rather,	he rejects	the	terms	of	Hume's	question.	For	by	Kant's	lights,	were	reason not	practical,	there	would	be	no	will,	and	our	actions	would	not	be	fit for	rational	and	so	moral	assessment.	We'd	simply	be	clever	animals, which	is	more	or	less	what	Hume	thought.20 II Return,	then,	to	the	question	of	cognitivism.	Does	Kant's	conception of the	will suggest	a cognitivist conception	of	practical reason?	The 19. For	excellent	discussion	of	this	basic	point,	see	Korsgaard's	"Skepticism	about Practical	Reason",	in	her	Creating the Kingdom of Ends	(Cambridge:	Cambridge University	Press,	1996). 20.	In	this	way,	Kant's	true	"reply"	to	Hume	in	practical	philosophy	parallels	his "reply"	in	theoretical	philosophy.	Kant's	strategy	throughout	is	to	assume	the reality	of	a	certain	rational	achievement	and	then	to	ask	what	must	be	true	in order	for	that	achievement	to	be	possible.	His	answer,	in	both	cases,	turns	on his	conviction	that	there	must	be	more	to	the	human	mind	than	dreamt	of	in Humean	philosophy.	Instead	of impressions, ideas,	and	laws	of	association, there	are	faculties	of	sensibility	and	understanding,	each	with	its	own	formal principles;	and	there	is	a	faculty	of	will,	through	which	reason	is	immediately practical.	Without	the	former,	Kant	thinks,	we	could	not	do	physics.	Without the	latter,	we	could	not	act	well.	Of	course,	such	forms	of	argument	will	fail	to satisfy	an	inveterate	skeptic,	who	finds	Kant's	starting	assumptions	dubious. But	Kant's	concern	is	not	the	refutation	of	skepticism.	It	is	the	explanation	of our	manifest	rational	achievements,	theoretical	and	practical. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) propositional	attitudes,	not	all	of	which	are	naturally	captured	by	the term	"judgment".	Though	we	may	hold	a	proposition	to	be	true,	say, when	we	merely entertain it,	we are not thereby committed to the truth	of	the	proposition,	in	such	a	way	that	our	attitude	is	subject	to epistemic	evaluation.	We	manifest	no	epistemic	defect,	for	example,	if it	turns	out	that	the	proposition	is	false	or,	indeed,	if	we	take	it	to	be false.22	In	what	follows,	I	will	be	interested	only	in	those	holdings-tobe-true	that	involve	epistemic	commitment,	where	this	involves	two elements:	(i)	a	commitment	that	everyone	who	represents	the	same object	in	the	same	circumstances	should	judge	in	the	same	way,	and (ii)	a	commitment that	everyone	should	so judge	because that judgment	agrees	with	its	object	-	i. e.,	is	true	(P	4:298,	KrV	A821/B849).23 I reserve	the	term	"judgment"	for	just	these	attitudes. Third, in	my	discussion	of	the	faculty	of	desire, I	noted	that	Kant uses	the	term	"determining	ground"	to	refer	to	features	of	an	individual's	psychology that	explain	why	she	desires	as	she	does.	Kant	employs	the	term	in	a	similar	way	in	the	case	of	judgment.	Determining grounds	of	judgment	are	those	features	of	an	individual's	psychology that	explain	why	she	judges	as	she	does.	As	determining	grounds	of 22. There are also holdings-to-be-true in which we are committed to the truth	of the	proposition	but	not in	such	a	way that	our	attitude is	subject to	epistemic	evaluation.	This	is	the	kind	of	attitude	that	Kant	calls	"belief" [Glaube]	-	e. g., our (practically	warranted)	belief that	God	exists. In such cases,	we	escape	epistemic	evaluation	because the	grounds	on	which	we hold	our	proposition	to	be	true	are	not	epistemic.	For	sympathetic	recent discussion,	see	Andrew	Chignell, "Belief in	Kant",	Philosophical Review 116, No.3, 2007: 323–360. For more directly philosophical discussion of the complicated relation	between	propositional	attitudes	and truth, see J.	David	Velleman,	"On	the	Aim	of	Belief",	in	his	The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000). 23.	Notably,	Kant	thinks	that	(i)	and	(ii)	can	come	apart.	This	happens	in	the	case of	aesthetic	judgment,	where	it	is	precisely	this	separation	that	sets	the	problem	of	the	critique	of	taste:	how	can	aesthetic	judgments	make	good	on	their claim	to	universal	validity	when	the	ground	of	this	validity	is	a	feature	of	our subjectivity	-	i. e.,	pleasure	-	rather	than	a	feature	of	the	object?	Kant's	idealism	complicates	the	contrast	here,	since,	in	the	case	of	theoretical	cognition at	least,	the	object	itself	depends	on	the	mind.	Kant	is	clear,	though,	that	the dependence	on	subjectivity	exhibited	in	the	aesthetic	and	theoretical	cases	is quite	different	(KU 5:189). as	good	really is	good?	Or	would	such	an	assessment	betray	a	kind of	category	mistake, importing	standards into	an	area	of	rational	endeavor	where	they	simply	do	not	apply?	Reflection	on	such	questions might	lead	one	to	think	that,	despite	what	Kant	seems	to	say,	he	really does	restrict	cognition	to	the	theoretical	domain,	and	so	cannot	hold	a cognitivist	conception	of	practical	reason	after	all. Now, I	accept that	a	cognitivist	conception	of	practical reason	requires	thinking	about	the	correctness	conditions	of	practical	judgment in	terms	of	accuracy,	but	I	do	not	think	this	betrays	a	category	mistake. In	my	view,	practical	judgments,	every	bit	as	much	as	theoretical	judgments, are claims	about	how things stand	with respect to a subject matter,	and	so	are	appropriately	assessed	in	terms	of	their	agreement with	that	subject	matter.	In	order	to	explain	why,	though,	I	must	first say	more	about	how	I	understand	the	evaluative	framework	appropriate	to	cognitive	judgment.	I	will	focus	on	theoretical	judgment,	which I	assume	is	uncontroversially	cognitive,	but	only	temporarily.	As	I	will argue	in	the	next	section,	the	framework	applies,	mutatis mutandis,	to practical	judgment	as	well. First,	though	cognitions	in	general	function	to	be	accurate,	there	are different	kinds	of	accuracy	appropriate	to	different	kinds	of	cognitions. Since	judgment	is	a	specifically	conceptual,	propositional	kind	of	cognition,	Kant	associates	it	with	a	specifically	conceptual,	propositional kind	of	accuracy:	truth	(JL	9:53,	KrV	A293/B350).	More	specifically,	a judgment is true just in	case the	subject	of the judgment	really	possesses	the	property	attributed	to	it	by	the	predicate	of	the	judgment.21 Second,	in	my	previous	discussion,	I	passed	over	an	ambiguity	in Kant's	use	of the term	"judgment" [Urteil].	Kant	uses this term	to	refer	to	both	the	propositional	attitude	of	judging	and	the	propositional content	judged.	When	referring	specifically	to	the	attitude,	Kant	will often use the more specific term Fürwahrhalten -	literally, "holdingto-be-true"	(JL	9:66,	KrV	820/B848).	It	is	important	to	see	that	Kant's notion	of	holding-to-be-true	is	very	broad,	covering	a	wide	variety	of 21. And	so,	to	be	clear,	this	is	truth	in	a	substantial	and	not	merely	deflationary sense. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) Take one of Kant's examples: He offers the familiar case of the moon's looking larger	when it is just	over the	horizon than it looks when	it	is	higher	in	the	sky	(KpV	A297/B354,	A	7:146).	This,	he	says,	is an	empirical	illusion.25	The	way	things	appear	to	be	through	our	senses	is	not	the	way	they	are.	Sometimes	we	can	shake	off	our	illusions, bringing	the	appearance	back	into	line	with	how	we	know	things	to be.	But	even	when	we	can't	shake	off	the	illusion,	as	in	this	case,	we can	still	avoid	being	taken	in	by	it.	The	astronomer	and	the	astronomically	naïve	person	suffer	the	same	illusory	appearance.	But	while	the former	is	not	"deceived	by	this	illusion",	and	so	does	not	render	judgment	on	its	basis,	the	latter	does	(KrV	A297/B354).	It	is	precisely	this	in which	his	error	consists. Kant	elaborates	this	difference	between	erroneous	and	non-erroneous	judgment	in	terms	of	a	difference	between	two	kinds	of	grounds of judgment:	subjective	and	objective.	A	subjective	ground	is	a	consideration	that indicates	only	something	about	the	subject's	relation to	the	object.	An	objective	ground,	by	contrast, indicates	something about	the	object	itself.	Thus,	though	we	always	come	to	judgment	on the	basis	of considerations that	we take to indicate the truth	of the relevant	proposition	-	in	these	terms,	on	what	we	regard	as	objective grounds	-	we	are	not	always	right	in	this.	As	Kant	says,	under	the	influence	of sensibility,	we	sometimes "take	merely	subjective grounds to	be	objective,	and	consequently	confuse	the mere illusion of truth with truth itself"	(JL	9:54,	Kant's	emphasis). Applying this	distinction	to the	current	case,	we	can	see that the astronomically	naïve	person,	in	mistaking	a	feature	of	his	subjectivity for	a	feature	of	the	object,	errs	in	judging	on	what	can	only	be	a	subjective	ground.	The	astronomer,	by	contrast,	makes	no	such	mistake. She	corrects	for	the	biases	of	her	perceptual	system,	and	so	is	guided in	her	judgment	not	simply	by	her	subjective	constitution	but	by	the 25. I	count	four	kinds	of	illusion	in	Kant:	empirical	illusion	(KpV	A295/B352,	A 7:146),	moral illusion (VL Vienna 24:832,	VE Collins 27:348), logical illusion (KpV	A296/B353),	and transcendental illusion	(KpV	A297/B353). I consider empirical illusion	here	and	moral illusion later. I consider logical	and transcendental	illusion	not	at	all. judgment	in	particular, these	grounds	must	take	a	specific	form.	For Kant	thinks	of	intellectual	faculties	as	active	faculties	that	require	the subject's self-conscious involvement in a way that merely sensible, passive	faculties	do	not.	Kant	respects	this	condition	by	claiming	that a	subject	comes	to judgment	only	as	a	result	of taking	some	consideration	to	count	in	favor	of	so	judging;	or,	more	specifically,	a	subject comes	to	hold	a	proposition	true	only	as	a	result	of	taking	some	consideration	to	indicate	its	truth.	When	the	subject	does	so,	that	consideration	becomes	the	ground	of	her	judgment.24 If	this	is	right,	then	we	should	expect	Kant's	account	of	the	evaluative	framework	appropriate	to	cognitive	judgment	to	be	rather	more complicated than the	simple	picture	advanced	above.	That is to say, we	should	expect	that	a	subject	is	intellectually	successful	not	merely when	her	judgments	are	true.	We	should	also	expect	that	she	is	intellectually	successful	when	the	grounds	of	her	judgment	are	appropriately	related	to	the	truth. In	order	to	see	how	Kant	integrates	the	appropriateness	of	grounds into	his	account	of intellectual	success, I	want to look	first	at	his	account	of	how	we	go	wrong	with	respect	to	our	judgment.	In	particular, I	want	to	look	at	his	account	of	cognitive	error.	According	to	Kant,	error is	not just	any	cognitive	defect. It	has	two	essential	marks: falsehood	and	illusion	[Schein]	(VL Vienna	24:824,	JL	9:55,	KrV	A293/B249– A298/B355).	The	first	is	straightforward.	Error	requires,	as	Kant	says,	a "holding-to-be-true of falsehood" (VL Vienna 24:832). But	mere falsehood	is	not	enough	for	error.	In	order	to	err,	we	must	hold	a	falsehood to	be	true	as	a	consequence	of	illusion. 24.	One	might	wonder	whether	my	claim	that	a	subject	comes	to	judgment	by taking	some	consideration	to	count	in	favor	of	so	judging	introduces	a	noncognitive	element	into	judgment. I	do	not	think	that it	does.	The	taking-tocount-in-favor	attitude	can	itself	be	understood	cognitively,	as	answerable	to its	subject	matter	-	i. e.,	what	(really)	counts	in	favor	of	what.	Indeed,	I	think this	understanding	is	important	for	Kant's	account	of	how	we	go	wrong	with respect	to	the	grounds	of	our	judgment.	I	offer	an	account	of	this	mistake	in my	discussion	of	error	below.	For	contemporary	discussion	of	related	issues, see	Scanlon's	What We Owe to Each Other,	Chapter	1,	§11. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) a	volition	on	grounds	that	we	took	to	indicate	its	goodness.	But	is	it really	plausible	to	think	of	practical	judgments	in	this	way?	To	answer this	question,	recall	the	two	aspects	of	epistemic	commitment	I	identified	as	essential	to	cognitive	judgment:	(i)	a	commitment	that	everyone	who	represents	the	same	object	in	the	same	circumstances	should judge	in	the	same	way,	and	(ii)	a	commitment	that	everyone	should	so judge	because	that	judgment	agrees	with	its	object	-	i. e.,	is	true. With respect to the demand for universal agreement, one	might query	whether	it	is	possible	to	render	a	less	ambitious	practical	judgment,	one	that	is	about	how	it	is	good	to	will	yet	doesn't	involve	any claim	that	everyone	should	agree.	Indeed,	doesn't	Kant	think	we	do just	this	with	respect	to	volitions	that	would	promote	our	private	ends, our	happiness?	I	will	have	more	to	say	about	judgments	involving	our happiness	in	a	moment,	but	the	first	thing	to	note	is	that	a	demand for	universal	agreement	does	not	seem	at	all	foreign	to	practical	judgment.	This is	evident from	Kant's	various	characterizations	of	goodness.	As	Kant	says	in	the	Groundwork,	good	"is	that	which	determines the	will	by	means	of	representations	of	reason,	hence	not	by	subjective	causes	but	objectively,	that	is,	from	grounds	that	are	valid	for	every	rational	being	as	such"	(G	4:413).	He	says	much	the	same	thing	in the	second	Critique,	when	he	asserts	that	"what	we	are	to	call	good must	be	an	object	of the faculty	of	desire in the judgment	of	every reasonable	human	being"	(KpV	5:60).	Where	there	is	no	demand	for universal	agreement, then, there	seems	to	be	no	claim	of	goodness and	so	no	practical	judgment. But	even	if	practical	judgment	does	involve	a	demand	for	universal agreement,	one	might	still	wonder	whether	it	also	involves	a	correlative	demand	that	everyone	should	so	agree	because	the	judgment	is true.	There	are	deep	Kantian	reasons	to	worry	whether	the	notion	of truth	transfers	well	into	the	practical	domain.	Suppose	for	now,	though, that	these	worries	can	be	assuaged.	What	would	follow,	I	think,	is	a natural	and	plausible	account	of	how	we	go	right	and	wrong	in	our practical	judgments.	I	want	to	trace	the	outlines	of	this	view	to	show	its power	before	I	discuss	possible	Kantian	misgivings	about	it. character	of	the	object.	That	is,	her	judgment	is	"determined	through objective	grounds	of	truth	that	are	independent	of	the	nature	and	the interest	of	the	subject"	(JL	9:70).	In	this	respect,	we	can	say	that	her judgment	is	not	simply	true	but	also	well-grounded.	When	this	is	so, Kant	thinks,	her	judgment	qualifies	as	knowledge	[Wissen].26 I	noted	above	that	since	we	are	intellectual	beings,	who	hold	propositions	to	be	true	on	grounds	that	we	take	to	indicate	their	truth,	we should	expect that	we	are intellectually	successful	not	merely	when our	judgments	are	true.	We	should	also	expect	that	we	are	intellectually	successful	when	the	grounds	of	our	judgments	are	appropriately related	to	the	truth.	We	are	now	in	a	position	to	make	good	on	this expectation.	By	reflecting	on	the	notion	of	error,	we	have	seen	more clearly	the	ways	in	which	we	can	go	wrong	(and	right)	in	judging	as	we do.	Just	as	error	seems	something	worse	than	mere	falsehood,	so	does knowledge	seem	something	better	than	mere	truth.	The	former	leaves us	unmoored	from	the	subject	matter	in	a	way	that	seems	to	do	special offense	to	our	intellectual	ambitions.	For	not	only	do	we	misjudge	the object,	but	the	grounds	for	such	judgment	are	not	at	all	suited	to	their task.	We	are	thus	doubly	mistaken:	with	respect	to	the	object	and	with respect	to	what	considerations	should	guide	our	thinking	about	it.	As rational	beings,	who	strive	to	direct	the	course	of	our	cognitive	lives in	accordance	with	epistemic	standards,	we	demand	to	be	right	about both.	Only	knowledge	satisfies	this	demand,	thereby	doing	justice	to our	rational	vocation.	It	is	the	acme	of	intellectual	success. III Now, if practical judgments were truly cognitive, then we should expect them	to	have	all	of the features	of	cognitive judgment that I just described. In judging that a volition is good	we	would	be staking	a claim	about	a	genuine subject	matter, attributing	goodness to 26.	Kant's discussion of knowledge is more complex than the simple view I discuss	here	-	for	example,	it	includes	a	claim	to	certainty	(JL	9:70–72,	KrV A822/B852).	That	said,	I	think	my	gloss	captures	Kant's	core	idea,	at	least	well enough	for	present	purposes. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) cation	of	goodness.	To	see	what	he	has	in	mind,	I	want	to	look	at	what he	calls	"moral	illusion". Kant	says	that	"moral	illusion	is	when	that	which	serves	our	best interest seems to arise from	duty" (VL Vienna 24:832). Since	we are discussing	practical	judgment,	and	so	goodness	in	general,	the	inclusion	of	duty	here	may	seem	puzzling,	but	I	do	not	think	it	should	be. For	if	practical	judgment	really	involves	full	epistemic	commitment,	as I	am	here	supposing,	then	duty	is	a	rather	more	ordinary	notion	than it	might	otherwise	seem.	Kant	is	often	read	as	if	he	takes	duty	-	and related deontological notions, such as imperatives, obligation, and the	like	-	to	represent	alternatives	to	goodness	or	perhaps	to	capture only	one	special	"moral"	sense	of	goodness,	where	this involves	the thought	that	we	must	do	something,	whether	or	not	we	want	to.	I	do not think	either	of these readings is correct. First,	Kant is clear that these	notions	apply	to	us	simply	because	we	do	not	always	do	what we	represent	as	good	(G	4:413).	But	this	is	not	to	displace	goodness. It is	simply to	remark	on	our	relation to it,	as imperfect	beings.	Second,	as	we	have	already	seen,	Kant	believes	that	cognitive	judgment in	general	involves	a	commitment	to	universal	agreement	on	the	basis of	truth.	But	if	so,	then	deontological	demands	follow	from	the	nature of	judgment	as	such:	judge	this	way	rather	than	that,	not	because	you want	to	but	because	it	is	true,	or	at	least	indicated	by	the	evidence.29 Though	we	are	perhaps	less	likely	to	speak	about	duty	and	obligation in	theoretical	cases,	it	seems	that	the	same	basic	concepts	apply.	If	this is	right,	then	we	should	be	rather	less	impressed	than	we	tend	to	be by	this	deontological	side	of	Kant.	The	claims	of	duty	turn	out	to	be	no more	than	the	claims	of	truth	upon	judgment.30 The	moral	illusion,	then,	that	Kant	associates	with	practical	error is really rather	ordinary.	Think	of the	perils	of	gift-giving,	where it is	all	too	easy	to	buy	for	another	what	one	really	wants	for	oneself. 29. "Everyone	must	believe	a	fact	if	it	is	sufficiently	attested,	just	as	he	must	believe	a	mathematical	demonstration,	whether	or	not	he	wants	to"	(O	8:146). 30.	As	Kant	says,	"to	do	something	from	duty	means	to	obey	reason"	(VP	9:483). In	the	case	of	judgment,	we	obey	reason	by	seeking	and	conforming	to	truth. Return	to	the	question	I	set	aside	above	-	viz.,	how	to	understand what	seem	to	be	merely	private	judgments.	If	what	I	just	said	about universal agreement is correct, then such judgments are, strictly speaking,	not	possible.	One	can,	of	course,	judge	that	willing	in	a	certain	way	will	advance	one's	interest	or	make	oneself	happy.	But,	Kant thinks,	these	are	not	practical	judgments	at	all.	They	are	theoretical judgments	about	the	natural	order	of	cause	and	effect	-	e. g.,	acting	in such	and	such	a	way	is	a	means	to	the	satisfaction	of	my	inclinations or	the	production	of	a	certain	feeling.27	Such	judgments	may	be	relevant	to	our	thinking	what	to	do,	but	they	cannot	be	identified	with any	such	thought. So	what	should	we	say,	then,	of	cases	in	which	it	seems	as	if	the judgment	is	merely	private?	What	has	gone	wrong?	In	order	to	answer this	question, I	want to	return to	Kant's	account	of	error,	supposing, again, that this account applies straightforwardly to practical judgment.	Recall,	we	err	when	we	hold	a	falsehood	to	be	true	as	a	consequence	of	illusion.	In	the	practical	case,	the	falsehood	is	clear	-	judging	a	volition	good	when	it	is	not	-	but	the	relevant	illusion	may	seem harder to spot.	Given that the	object here is volition and that	Kant does	not	think	that	we	have	a	special	sense-perceptual	faculty	trained on	volition,	there	is	no	direct	analog	to	the	case	of	empirical	illusion	I discussed	earlier.	That	said,	Kant	does	think	that	there	is	a	subjective element	involved	in	our	representation	of	volition,	the	feeling	of	pleasure.	It is	important	to	recognize	here	that	Kant	does	not	accept	the view,	endorsed	by	his	rationalist	predecessors,	that	pleasure	is	literally an	appearance	of	goodness. 28	Pleasures	are,	as	Kant	says,	"merely	subjective",	and	so	"they	represent	nothing	at	all	in	the	object	but	simply a	relation	to	the	subject"	(MS	6:212,	KU	5:189,	KU	5:204).	Nevertheless, Kant	thinks	that	we	are	inclined	to	regard	pleasure	as	if	it	were	an	indi27. On	the	mistake	of	thinking	that	propositions	concerning	the	mere	production of	effects	are	really	practical	at	all,	see	the	discussion	of	practical	and	theoretical	propositions	in	the	introductions	to	the	third	Critique	(KU	5:171–173,	KU EE	20:195–201). 28.	Kant	discusses	the	Wolffian	view	that	pleasure	is	a	mode	of	cognition	at	LM Dohna 28:674. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) the	moral law	that it is indulgent in	regard	to	ourselves"	(VE Collins 27:348).	I	think	this	describes	the	liar's	mistake	exactly.	The	liar	-	call him	"Paul"	-	does	not	seek	to	exempt	himself	from	the	law.	He	rather proposes	a	law	that	itself	includes	an	exemption,	not	just	for	himself but for everyone. Put another	way: Paul knows that lying	promises are	suspect; it is	not	good	to	do them,	at least	not	usually.	What	he is	considering	here	is	whether, in	these	circumstances,	the	presumption	against	lying	is	rebutted.	What	Paul	(and	so	we)	learn	by	asking whether	his	maxim	can	be	universalized	is	that	the	presumption	holds. His	indulgent	law	is,	as	Kant	says,	a	false	law,	and	so	no	law	at	all. 32 Understanding	Paul's	mistake	in	this	way	allows	us	to	see	this	case as	of	a	piece	with	the	kind	of	error	described	above.	For	Paul,	like	me when I am	shopping for	gifts,	wrongly judges	his volition	good,	because	that	which	serves	his	interest	seems	to	arise	from	duty.	Under the	influence	of	need,	Paul	judges	that	it	is	good	to	make	a	lying	promise	in	order	to	get	money,	even	though	he	evidently	suspects	that	this may	not	be	the	case.	As	a	rational	being,	Paul	aims	to	judge	his	volitions	good	on	account	of	their	goodness.	But	in	this	case,	his	feelings intrude,	and	so	he	misses	his	mark.	Again,	subjective	grounds	supersede	objective	ones. Thus	far,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	construing	practical	judgment	in straightforwardly	cognitive	and	epistemic	terms	-	the	same	terms	that apply	to	theoretical	judgment	-	yields	a	natural	and	plausible	account of	how	practical	judgment	goes	right	and	wrong.	Throughout	this	discussion,	I	have	spoken	casually	about	truth.	One	might	worry,	though, that such casual talk	obscures an important	difference	between the theoretical	and	practical	cases,	a	difference	that	limits	the	full	assimilation	of	the	practical	to	the	cognitive. 32.	Cf.	Kant's	suggestion	that	the	practical	philosophy	of	Groundwork	II	is,	in	part, a	response	to	our	being	subject	to	a	"natural dialectic,	that	is,	a	propensity	to rationalize	against	those	strict	laws	of	duty	...	and,	where	possible,	to	make them	better	suited	to	our	wishes	and	inclinations..."	(G	4:405,	Kant's	emphasis).	Of	course,	the	connection	between	dialectic	and	illusion	is	deep	in	Kant; dialectic	is,	as	he	says,	"a	logic	of	illusion"	(KrV	A61/B86,	A239/B249). I	may judge it	good,	and	so in this sense	my	duty, to	buy	my	partner	a	new	TV	in	order	to	make	her	happy,	even	though,	in	reality,	I want	it	much	more	than	she.	In	such	a	case,	what	seems	to	arise	from duty	is	simply	something	that	serves	my	interest.	Though	I	come	to judgment	on the	basis	of considerations that I take to indicate the truth	about	what	is	good,	I	am	nonetheless	mistaken.	My	judgment	is clouded	by	the	pleasure	I	take	in	my	proposed	activity,	and	I	fall	prey to	a	kind	of	illusion.	That	is,	I	judge	my	volition	good	on	grounds	that merely	indicate	something	about	my	relation	to	the	volition	-	how	I feel about it	-	rather than something about the volition itself	-	its goodness.	In	this	way,	we	can	understand	practical	error	on	the	model	of	empirical	error,	insofar	as	both	involve	a	confusion	of	subjective and	objective	grounds.31 If	this	is	really	the	right	way	to	understand	how	practical	judgment goes	wrong,	we	should	also	expect	it	to	explain	some	of	the	more	familiar	mistakes	that	Kant	discusses	-	e. g.,	the	lying	promise	in	Groundwork	II.	To	see	how	it	might	do	this,	consider	another	characterization of	moral	illusion.	In	the	Collins	Lectures on Ethics,	Kant	distinguishes two	kinds	of	moral	fantasies	[Träume],	only	the	first	of	which	will	interest	us	here.	We	fall	prey	to	this	fantasy,	Kant	says,	when	we	"fancy	of 31. One	might	worry	that	I	do	not	allow	feeling	enough	room	in	practical	judgment.	For	example,	can't	I	permissibly	judge	it	good	to	indulge	my	taste	for the	early	films	of	Mike	Myers,	provided	that	I	wouldn't	be	shirking	any	obligation	by	doing	so?	And	doesn't	this	show	that	practical	judgment	sometimes permits	subjective	grounds,	so	long	as	those	grounds	are	not	in	conflict	with morality?	Yes	and	no.	In	the	proposed	case,	I	judge	as	I	do	because	I	feel	as	I do.	But	it	does	not	follow	from	this	that	the	ground	of	my	judgment	is	therefore	subjective.	Indeed,	odd	as	it	may	sound,	I	think	that	the	feeling	here	is	(or is	part	of)	an	objective	ground.	Why?	Because,	in	this	case,	the	feeling	functions	not	as	a	source	of	illusion,	a	distorting	influence	on	judgment.	Rather, it	functions	as	evidence	about	what	it	is	good	for	me	to	do;	and	judgment	on the	basis	of	evidence	is	the	paradigm	of	judgment	on	an	objective	ground.	In this	way,	I	think	there	is	no	deep	difference	between	how	I	take	account	of my	feelings	and	how	I	take	account	of	another's.	There	is	no	problem	in	considering	my	partner's	likes	and	dislikes	when	I'm	buying	her	a	gift	-	indeed,	I should	-	and	there	is	no	problem	in	considering	my	likes	and	dislikes	when I'm	deciding	how	best	to	spend	my	evening	-	indeed,	I	should.	Thus,	so	far as	I	can	see,	permitting	feeling	this	kind	of	role	in	practical	judgment	presents no	problem	for	my	account. e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) essence	of	autonomy	is	practical	reason's	answerability	to	no	authority beyond	itself,	then,	so	far	as	I	can	see,	autonomy	has	no	direct	bearing on	Kant's account of the function of judgment. Its only direct bearing	is	on	Kant's	account	of	the	truth-maker	of	judgment.	In	particular, while it is inconsistent	with	autonomy	for	practical judgments	to	be true	in	virtue	of	their	conformity	with	an	order	of	value	independent	of reason,	it	is	not	inconsistent	with	autonomy	for	practical	judgments	to be	true	in	virtue	of	their	conformity	with	an	order	of	value	dependent on reason. For in cognizing, and so conforming, to a reason-dependent	subject	matter,	practical	judgment,	and	so	reason,	would	simply be	conforming	to	itself.	Autonomy,	then,	presents	no	obstacle	to	cognitivism.	Practical	reason	simply	needs	to	be	its	own	object. Consider,	for	example,	the	familiar	Kantian	thought	that	practical judgments	are	correct	just	in	case	they	satisfy	a	set	of	rationally	supported	procedural	conditions	-	paradigmatically,	the	ones	laid	out	in the	so-called	"CI	procedure".	This	proceduralist,	or	constructivist,	view is sometimes presented as an alternative to thinking about correctness	in	terms	of	truth.	But	I	do	not	think	that	the	basic	constructivist thought	requires	so	radical	an	interpretation.	Constructivism	need	not be	construed	as	a	rejection	of	truth.	Rather, it	could	equally	well	be construed	as	an	elaboration	of	the	truth	conditions	of	practical	judgment.	Satisfaction	of	procedural	conditions	makes	volition	good,	and so	a	judgment	that	represents	a	volition	as	good	when	that	volition	in fact	satisfies	these	conditions	represents	its	subject	matter	aright.	The volition	to	which	goodness	is	attributed	really	is	good,	and	the	judgment	that	makes	this	attribution	really	is	true.33 Now,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	I	don't	think	that	Kant	is	a	constructivist in	this	sense.34	But	I	don't	think	that	much	matters	here.	My	present 33.	Obviously, this	cognitivist form	of	constructivism	is	different from	the	noncognitivist	form	of	constructivism	that	I	attributed	to	Korsgaard	in	my	introduction.	I	suspect	that	part	of	the	appeal	of	Korsgaard's	view,	at	least	to	fellow Kantians,	stems	from	a	failure	to	distinguish	clearly	between	these	positions. 34. This	is	a	large	topic,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	I	will	offer	a	brief	comment.	The	key, I think, to	resisting	Kantian	constructivism	is to	emphasize Kantian	teleology.	I	claimed	in	§I	that	our	faculties	have	essential	functions, In	the	previous	section,	I	identified	truth	as	the	propositional	form of accuracy. Thus, on the current view, practical judgment is true just in	case the	subject	matter	of judgment is	as it is represented to be	-	i. e.,	just	in	case	the	volition	to	which	goodness	is	attributed	really is good. But, one	might think, this idea of truth cannot be straightforwardly	applied	to	the	practical	case,	because	it	is	at	odds	with	the key	Kantian	commitment	to	autonomy.	Indeed,	it	might	seem	that	it is precisely such an application that Kant is criticizing	when he accuses	his	rationalist	predecessors	of	positing	a	heteronomy	of	reason and	will	(G	4:441–444).	In	seeking	to	ground	ethics	in	the	cognition of an independent	order	of value	-	an	order to	which reason	must conform	-	such	theories	cast	practical	reason	as	answerable	to	an	authority	beyond	itself.	The	only	way	to	respect	the	autonomy	of	reason, then,	is	to	abandon	cognitivist	ambitions	altogether. In	assessing	this	line	of	thought,	it	is	important	to	distinguish	two kinds	of	claims	that	are	easily	run	together	in	these	discussions:	claims about	the	function	of	judgment	and	claims	about	the	truth-makers	of judgment.	Once	we recognize this distinction,	we can see that the traditional	rationalism	Kant	is	criticizing	is	best	represented	as	a	conjunction of two claims: one about the function of judgment	-	cognitive	-	and another about	what	makes those judgments true	-	an order	of	value	independent	of	reason.	Kant's	rejection	of	traditional rationalism,	then,	could	take	one	of	two	forms,	depending	on	which of	these	claims	is	the	locus	of	his	criticism.	He	could	reject	the	traditionalists'	cognitivism,	in	which	case,	trivially,	he	would	reject	their account	of	the	truth-maker	as	well.	(If	a	judgment	does	not	function to	be	true,	it	has	no	truth-conditions	and	so	no	truth-makers.)	But	he could	also	reject	their	account	of	the	truth-maker	while	leaving	their cognitivism	in	place.	That	is,	he	could	think	that	practical	judgments function	to	be	true	but	deny	that	such	judgments	are	made	true	by	an order	of	value	independent	of	reason. So	which	of	these	positions	is	Kant's?	Is	his	autonomy	objection	to traditional	rationalism	primarily	to	its	cognitivism	or	to	its	account	of the	truth-maker	of	practical	judgment?	I	believe	it	is	the	latter.	If	the e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) account	of	the	good	will.	Such	exploration	will	further	demonstrate	the significance	of	my	thesis,	as	well	as	provide	indirect	corroboration	of	it. The	key	to	understanding	the	good	will,	I	believe,	is	to	understand the	goodness	of	the	will	in	terms	of	the	goodness	of	the	judgment	that determines	it.	What	it	is	to	will	is	to	come	to	volition	through	practical judgment.	What	it	is	to	will	well	is	to	come	to	volition	through	practical	knowledge.	To	see	this,	consider	Kant's	infamous	claim	that	actions that	express	a	good	will	are	done	from	duty	and	not	from	other	motives. First,	as	I	argued	earlier,	we	should	be	rather	less	impressed	than we tend to	be	by the	deontological side	of	Kant.	Duty is simply the guise	under	which	imperfect	beings	represent	the	good.	Acting	from duty,	then,	is	no	more	and	no	less	than	being	guided,	in	one's	actions, by	what is good. That is to say, an agent acts from	duty	when she comes	to	volition	through	a	practical judgment	that	she	holds	to	be true	on	objective	grounds	of	goodness. If	this	is	the	right	way	to	understand	duty,	then	it	should	be	fairly apparent	that	many	of	the	familiar	worries	about	acting	from	duty	rest on	misunderstandings	-	e. g.,	the	concern	that	in	elevating	duty	Kant is	denigrating	other,	more	attractive	kinds	of	moral	motivation,	such	as emotion.	First	of	all,	if	the	determining	ground	of	the	will	is	practical judgment, then	emotion is	not	even	a	candidate	motive.	This is	not to	disparage	emotion.	It is	simply	to	deny	that it is the	right	kind	of psychological	state	to	play	a	role	in	volition.	If	I	am	moved	to	help	you simply	out	of	sympathy,	say,	and	not	as	a	consequence	of	judging	that helping	you	is	good,	then	the	problem	with	what	I	have	done	is	not simply	that	it	lacks	moral	worth.	The	problem	is	that	what	I	am	doing is	not,	properly	speaking,	willing	at	all. Alternatively,	if	I	am	moved	as	a	consequence	of	judging	that	helping	you	is	good,	but	the	ground	of	my	judgment	is	simply	my	sympathy, then	I	am	indeed	willing,	but	I	am	not	willing	well.	Why?	Because	the ground	of	my	judgment	is	subjective	rather	than	objective.	Though	I am	not	seduced	by	advantage,	as	in	the	case	of	Peter,	the	self-interested shopkeeper, I am	still	moved	by feeling rather than	evidence,	by my	relation	to	the	volition	rather	than	considerations	that	indicate	its concern is simply the relation between cognitivism and autonomy, and	the	example	of	constructivism,	because	it	is	familiar,	is	useful.	For if cognitivism	and	constructivism	are	consistent,	as I	am	suggesting, then	it	seems	that	cognitivism	and	autonomy	are	consistent	too.	Practical judgments	function	to	be	true,	but	since	they	are	made	true	by a	reason-dependent	subject	matter,	practical	reason	remains	answerable	to	itself	alone. If	I	am	right	about	all	this,	then	there	seems	no	reason	to	deny	that practical judgment is	cognitive in the	very	same	sense	as theoretical judgment. Though its subject matter and its motivational function differ, it	nonetheless involves the	same	aspects	of	epistemic	commitment	-	universal	agreement	on	the	basis	of	truth	-	and	it	is	naturally and	plausibly	assessed	in	cognitive,	and	so	epistemic,	terms.	I	conclude, then,	that	practicality	and	cognitivism	are	not	at	odds.	The	Kantian	account	of	practical	judgment	and	so	reason	combines	both. IV I	want	now	to	explore,	briefly,	some	of	the	implications	of	this	conclusion	for	our	understanding	of	Kant's	ethical	theory	-	in	particular,	his which	support	constitutive	standards,	determining	when	those	faculties	function	well	or	badly.	If	we	take	the	good	of	a	faculty	-	what	counts	as	success	for the	faculty	as	such	-	to	be	fixed	by	these	standards,	then	the	good	of	a	faculty will	be	set	by	its	nature.	Applied	to	practical	reason,	this	teleology	allows	Kant to	provide	a	straightforward	account	of	the	good's	dependence	on	reason	that appeals	not to	any	sort	of	construction	but	simply	to	the functional	nature of	reason	itself.	That	is,	the	good	of	reason	is	the	well-functioning	of	reason; and	so	practical	judgments	are	true	not	because	they	conform	to	a	procedural ideal	but	because	they	get	it	right	about	the	conditions	of	our	rational	flourishing.	In	this	respect,	I	believe	Kant's	view	is	not	so	different	from	Aristotle's. Many	recent	commentators	have	emphasized	similarities	between	Kant	and Aristotle	on	similar	issues,	though	no	one,	so	far	as	I	know,	makes	quite	this point	in	quite	this	way.	For	discussions	that	come	close,	see	Allen	W.	Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially Chapter	6;	Barbara	Herman,	"The	Difference	that	Ends	Make",	in	Lawrence Jost	and	Julian	Wuerth,	eds.,	Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011);	and,	somewhat surprisingly,	Christine	M.	Korsgaard,	Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009). e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) theoretical	reason,	has	a	cognitive	function,	and	so	believes	that	practical	reason,	no	less	than	theoretical	reason,	is	straightforwardly	subject	to	familiar	epistemic	standards	of	truth,	warrant,	and	knowledge. Thus,	Kant	would	not	agree	with	his	contemporary	followers,	such	as Korsgaard,	who insist	on	a radical	division	between theoretical and practical	reason,	each	with	its	own	function	and	so	subject	to	its	own standards. From the properly	Kantian point of view, such followers conflate	the	theoretical	and	the	cognitive,	rendering	impossible	what Kant	took	to	be	actual:	the	unity	of	reason	as	a	cognitive	faculty	that differs	merely	in	its	application. This is an important	historical result, but	my interest in it is not merely	historical.	Kant's issues	are, in	many	respects,	our issues too, and	we	may	yet	have	more	to	learn	from	his	reflections.	I	think	this	is especially	true	in	the	case	of	practical	rationalism.	For,	as	I	noted	in	my introduction,	it	seems	to	me	that	we	still	lack	a	clear	understanding	of this	view,	one	that	respects	both	the	differences	and	the	similarities between theoretical and	practical reason.	Of course, I cannot argue here	that	Kant	actually	provides	such	an	understanding.	Nevertheless, I	believe	we	would	do	well	to	take	his	views	on	these	matters	quite	seriously.	I	conclude	with	some	brief	remarks	about	why	this	might	be	so. Consider, for example, R. Jay	Wallace's characterization of theoretical and practical reason in his	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry	on	practical	reason.35	He	says	that	theoretical	reason	"involves reflection	with	an	eye	to	the	truth	of	propositions....	Practical	reason, by	contrast,	is	not	concerned	with	the	truth	of	propositions	but	with the	desirability	or	value	of	actions" (§I).	This	way	of thinking	about the	theoretical/practical	distinction	is,	I	believe,	far	from	idiosyncratic. Many	philosophers	would	put the	contrast in similar terms,	placing truth	on	one side	and	desirability	or	value	on the	other.36	However, this	neat	and	natural	framing	of	the	distinction	is	not	without	its	prob35. "Practical Reason", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta (ed.),	URL	=	<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2009/entries/practical-reason/>. 36.	Think	of	the	traditional	philosophical	trinity	of	truth,	goodness,	and	beauty. goodness.	This is	why	Kant	claims that	sympathetic	action,	however kindly, is	on	the	same	footing	as	action	on	the	basis	of	other inclinations	(G	4:398).	Even	if	the	volition	is	in	fact	good,	the	way	in	which	I come	to	judge	it	good	manifests	an	intellectual	estrangement	from	its goodness.	We	can	see,	then,	that	Kant's	real	concern	about	the	contingency	of	actions	not	done	from	duty	is	not	that	we	will	be	more	likely to	light	upon	the	wrong	action	but	that	our	actions	will	not	reflect	our knowledge	of	their	goodness. Moreover, for similar reasons, emotion can	neither enhance	nor detract	from	the	quality	of	one's	will.	Just	as	my	emotions	do	not	bear on	whether, in rendering a theoretical judgment, I achieve theoretical knowledge, so do	my emotions not bear on	whether, in rendering	a	practical	judgment,	I	achieve	practical	knowledge.	To	think	that they	do	is	simply	to	confuse	epistemic	evaluation	with	evaluation	of other	kinds.	This	is	not	to	say	that	emotions	are	irrelevant	to	good	willing.	For	example,	being	sympathetic	may	help	us	to	appreciate	better the	needs	of	others	and	so	to	make	correct	practical	judgments	about how	to	help	them	(MS	6:547).	Additionally,	the	presence	or	absence	of emotion	can	make	the	operations	of	the	good	will	easier,	by	reducing impediments	to	it	(G	3:393–394).	In	both	of	these	roles,	however,	emotions	do	not	and	cannot	make	for	good	willing.	They	simply	facilitate	it. It	should	be	clear,	then,	that	if	we	attribute	to	Kant	a	cognitivist	conception	of	practical	reason,	and	so	will,	the	account	of	the	good	will he	puts	forward	in	the	Groundwork is	exactly	the	account	we	should expect	him	to	have.	The	question	of	why	we	will	is	transparent	to	the question	of	why	we	judge,	and	so	doing	the	right	thing	for	the	right reason	is	simply	a	matter	of	judging	the	right	thing	for	the	right	reason. But	if	so,	then	there	should	be	little	doubt	about	what	kind	of	reason this	must	be.	It	must	be	an	objective	rather	than	subjective	ground.	It must	be	a	duty	rather	than	a	feeling. V In	this	paper,	I	have	argued	that	Kant	holds	a	cognitivist	conception of practical reason. He believes that practical reason, no less than e.	sonny	elizondo Reason in its Practical Application philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	13,	no.	21	(october	2013) in	truths	of	different	kinds:	truths	about	a	theoretical	subject	matter (what-is)	and	truths	about	a	practical	subject	matter (what-ought-tobe-done).	We	should	not	say,	then,	as	Wallace	does,	that	"[p]ractical reason,	by contrast [with theoretical reason], is	not concerned	with the	truth	of	propositions	but	with	the	desirability	or	value	of	actions" (§I).	Rather,	we	should	say	that	practical	reason	is	concerned	with	the truth	of	propositions	but	only	when	those	propositions	are	about	the desirability	or	value	of	actions.	In	this	way,	we	can	respect	the	distinction	between theoretical and	practical reason	without thinking that the	former	is	allied	to	truth	in	a	way	that	the	latter	is	not. Now,	for	all	that	I	have	argued	in	this	paper,	Kant's	account	may	not survive	philosophical	scrutiny.	That	remains	to	be	seen.	Nonetheless, if	these	remarks	are	on	the	right	track	-	if	there	are	difficulties	in	our contemporary	thought	that	Kant	might	help	us	resolve	-	then	I	think we should	welcome the further development of a properly	Kantian rationalism.38 38.	For	helpful	discussion	of relevant issues, I thank	Tyler	Burge,	Stephen	Darwall,	Michael	Della	Rocca,	Jay	Elliott,	Paul	Franks,	Barbara	Herman,	Yannig Luthra,	Lawrence	Pasternack,	Kelley	Schiffman,	two	anonymous	referees	for this journal,	and	audiences	at	The	Society for	Early	Modern	Philosophy	at Yale	and	the	2012	American	Philosophical	Association	Pacific	Division	Meeting.	The	research	leading	to	this	paper	was	supported	by	a	New	Faculty	Fellows	award	from	the	American	Council	of	Learned	Societies,	funded	by	The Andrew	W.	Mellon	Foundation. lems,	as	evidenced	by	Wallace's	subsequent	discussion	of	the	so-called "realist"	account	of	practical reason.	According to	Wallace, "[r]ealists picture	practical	reason	as	a	capacity	for	reflection	about	an	objective body	of	normative truths regarding	action" (§II).	But,	assuming that reflection	about	normative	truths	is	reflection	with	an	eye	to	the	truth of	propositions	about	normative	matters,	this	is	clearly	in	tension	with his	former	characterization	of	the	theoretical/practical	distinction.	Either concern	with the truth cannot be distinctive of theoretical reason	after	all,	because	practical	reason	is	concerned	with	the	truth	too; or,	such	concern	is	distinctive	of	theoretical	reason,	and	so	the	realist view	is,	properly	speaking,	no	view	of	practical	reason	at	all. The	problem	here	does	not	seem	to	be	merely	an	artifact	of	Wallace's phrasing. Indeed, it seems clear that something like it also underlies Korsgaard's	by	now	familiar	skepticism	about	cognitivist	conceptions	of practical reason.	Since	she thinks that theoretical reason is	essentially tied	to	truth	in	a	way	that	practical	reason	is	not,	she	in	effect	endorses	the second	disjunct	above	and	so	charges	cognitivists	(and	so	realists)	with offering	a	crypto-theoretical	account	of	practical	reason.	Not	everyone, of	course,	would	accept	this	conclusion.	Wallace	himself	would	resist	it, since	he	is	a	realist.37	But	it	is	not	so	clear	how	he	could	resist	it,	given	his original	way	of	framing	the	distinction.	That	is,	it	is	not	clear	how	he	(or anyone)	could	allow	both	theoretical	and	practical	reason	an	interest	in truth	without	thereby	obscuring	the	distinction	between	them. My	suggestion	is	that	we	can	look	to	Kant	for	help.	For	on	the	Kantian	account,	as	I	have	explained	it,	Wallace's	framing	betrays	a	kind of category	mistake.	Despite the naturalness of distinguishing theoretical	and	practical	reason	in	terms	of	truth	and	goodness,	these	are not	genuine	differentiae.	Truth	is	the	agreement	of	a judgment	with its	subject	matter,	whatever	that	may	be.	Goodness	is	a	subject	matter.	Consequently,	Kant	can	allow	both theoretical	and	practical reason	an	interest	in	truth,	so	long	as	he	insists	that	they	are	interested 37.	Wallace	endorses	realism	in	"Normativity	and	the	Will"	in	his	Normativity and the Will: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Practical Reason	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2006).